

26 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NIO Views on the Korean Crisis

On 25 August, [REDACTED] NIO for [REDACTED] Pacific, met with [REDACTED] and me to discuss intelligence activities in the recent Korean crisis. [REDACTED] described the sequence of events and her impressions:

- The first WSAG meeting (4:00 p.m., Wednesday, 18 August) resulted in SECSTATE instructing Philip Habib to set up an operational task force in the State Department Operations Center. Arthur Hummel (Asst. Sec. for East Asia) was named Task Force Chief. The TF had representatives from OSD/ISA, JCS, State Legal Advisor, State Public Affairs Office, the State Korean Desk Director, and either an NIO or a DDO representative. The TF kept track of and supervised U.S. actions decided on in WSAG, and produced a periodic SITREP on U.S. actions. This SITREP contained some intelligence information. [REDACTED] believed that less intelligence information reporting would have been duplicated if the National Intelligence SITREP had been produced on a schedule that would have permitted it to be appended to the State SITREP. There was little need for CIA to keep expert analysts in this TF on a 24-hour basis since the TF was primarily concerned with policy implementation and attendance there kept analysts away from their desks performing analysis and preparing reports and briefings. CIA representation in such a TF is needed, however, to keep track of events and would be essential if CIA operations were involved.

- The DCI called for a National Intelligence SITREP and, on Adm. [REDACTED] advise, designated DIA as Executive Agent for its production. Thus, another task force was set up and CIA analysts were detailed to participate. Physical facilities were lacking in DIA and there was initial confusion because it was not clear whether the TF members were to draft the SITREP or seek contributions. [REDACTED] did not know who received this SITREP or what impact it had.

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- At the direction of the DDCI, a CIA Task Force was also set up, headed by [REDACTED] from OCI. OCI and OSR contributed expertise to this TF. It was not clear to [REDACTED] why CIA set up this TF as CIA had provided participants in the State and DIA task forces. [REDACTED] noted that, because the DDI is functionally organized, it has difficulty in providing officers who can cover the full range of substantive problems arising in crises.

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- There was an adverse reaction from DOD and Adm. [REDACTED] when OSR, at [REDACTED] request, prepared a study on North Korean capabilities to respond to various types of U.S. actions. This report, intended to help the Chairman of the JCS in coping with the possible consequences of various U.S. options, was perceived as an unwanted CIA effort to prescribe U.S. response options. The Director was unsuccessful in correcting this misunderstanding.

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- Several lessons were learned from these events:

1. While it is useful to have representation in task forces that implement and consider U.S. options, care needs to be taken that the Community does not dissipate its limited analytic resources on participation in meetings, task forces, etc., at the expense of performing needed analysis and reporting tasks. The Community will need, however, to plan for participation in WSAG working groups.

2. The provisions and procedures for a Community task force to produce a National Intelligence Situation Report should be planned for and the need to implement this carefully considered to minimize unnecessary disruption of existing mechanisms.

3. There is a need to have a better understanding with State and DOD officials on the role, contribution, and relationship of intelligence to planning and decision-making.

4. The role of the NIO and the DDI, in particular, need to be carefully considered in crisis planning to make maximum use of existing relationships, procedures and capabilities with a minimum of disruption during a crisis.

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5. Greater care needs to be taken to alert senior officials on incipient crises.



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S E C R E T

August 25, 1976

SOME INFORMAL COMMENTS

SUBJECT: National Task Force - Korea, Description and Appraisal

25X1A 1. I served on the NTF from 1430 August 20 to  
25X1A 0130 August 21. [REDACTED] will be commenting on  
the function of the NTF and on his own experiences and  
judgments. [REDACTED] also served on Friday during  
the day.

2. The primary function of the NTF appeared to  
be to serve as a Sitrep producer. This limited task  
was done with difficulty.

3. An effort was made to have the NTF perform a  
broader mission. Gen. Wilson directed that the NTF  
comment on intelligence reports before they were dis-  
seminated to the US leadership assembled in the Emergency  
Conference Room on Friday evening. This necessitated  
establishing a courier system between the National  
Military Intelligence Center area and the NTF area,  
which were physically separated. No opportunity to  
comment arose, however, both because no intelligence of  
significance was reviewed, and because the National  
Military Command Center was receiving and displaying in  
the ECR all reports as fast as they came in. Comment:  
Gen. Wilson had the right idea, but it was not feasible  
under existing circumstances. The NMCC was THE place  
to be.

4. The NTF only included State (INR) representation  
on Thursday evening. There was no one from State on  
Friday at any time. A State rep reportedly was in NMCC  
to keep an eye on the operation from policy view point.

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5. The Thursday night Sitrep--the first one-- was largely taken from the LDXed CIA contribution, principally because the NTF could not get organized quickly enough. Friday day and night Sitreps were written by various DIA/NSA/CIA analysts on NTF with no direct input from CIA analysts at Headquarters.

6. NTF Sitreps were done with difficulty. For the two Sitreps on Friday, almost no original submissions from analysts (including the CIA member) survived without drastic revision, mostly by senior DIA analysts/team chiefs. Sections were rewritten several times or extensively edited. Few analysts or Chiefs knew what was appropriate to include or exclude, with result that even good copy was hacked to death. Comment: CIA member got best results by recommending subjects to be covered and general thrust to take and then reviewing final drafts.

7. DOD collection requirements group insisted on including large <sup>chunks</sup> ~~amounts~~ of material on special collection efforts, with no apparent awareness of what these efforts could realistically be expected to produce. Comment: Sitrep does not need to include detail collection requirements.

8. Overall production process was clumsy and time-consuming. Graphics for one Sitrep did not get done soon enough, even though Sitrep was delayed. The Friday night Sitrep was to be out by midnight, but extensive re-editing delayed it until about 0130. Comment: DIA managers of Sitrep seemed unwilling to write finis to Sitrep and revised parts of it again and again. Great importance was attached to the act of getting General Fauser's signature to the document.

9. The physical location of the NTF was about as bad as it could be. Perhaps when the NMIC physically relocates, provision will be made to accommodate a National Task Force in times of crisis. In particular the NTF should have direct access to incoming all source data, including operational information. Comment: It was clear that DOD officials were not going to provide operational information to the NTF until so directed; even then, great reluctance and

even outright hostility was displayed with regard to making ops info available to CIA. Comment: An even better location for a National Task Force, if it is to be other than merely a producer of Sitreps after the fact, would be in the NMCC with direct communications to the Emergency Conference Room, where senior policymakers are likely to be during crisis periods. (Friday evening Secretary of State, DCI, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director of DIA and others were in the ECR). The NMIC area itself was severely congested with high ranking types. The NTF was devoid of anyone of rank except before and after crisis moments. DCI Bush dropped by Friday after lunch with Clements, and Generals Wilson and Faurer visited to impart directions and advice.

10. DIA personnel clearly had difficulty in coping with national, as opposed to departmental, level problems. There were one or two individuals who had some sense of what the differences were, but most did not. NSA did rather better, and its reps made a substantial contribution. By and large, however, the CIA reps, especially [REDACTED] were responsible for what organization the NTF achieved, and for instituting procedures to keep matters moving along (e.g., separate folders for separating traffic, courier system with NMIC, organization of Sitrep itself).

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11. The CIA task force was getting information as fast if not faster than the NTF. For example, [REDACTED] called the CIA Ops Center frequently during the initial period Friday evening from his vantage point in the NMCC. He also called the NTF. Comment: These should be more regularly established communication flow. CIA should be hooked up to the NMCC electronically so that information displayed or briefed there can be received in CIA Ops Center at same time.

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12. CIA working spaces for an ad hoc task force are superior to those available at the Pentagon, although the facilities at NMCC and projected for the NMIC are superior to anything available so far in CIA.

13. I recommend that in any future National Task Force the staffing be community-wide and composed of experts. I also recommend that the NTF be directly involved in all aspects of the crisis, both in terms of staffing out the intelligence input to policy options and in terms of assessing the results and reactions.

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D R A F T

25 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: First National Task Force

1. The first national task force was formed on Thursday 19 August. Generals Wilson and Faurer briefed the group on what was expected. General Wilson promised at the outset that the task force would be privy to US military operations being planned but that the national task force could not publish any operational details except those which had already occurred.

A. Housekeeping Problems

There was a lack of almost everything, phones, typewriters and even traffic. The national task force was far removed from where the action was going on, i.e., the DIA task force and the DIA Operations Center (NMIC). This persisted throughout the crisis and in fact the working area for the national task force changed almost daily.

B. Representation on the Task Force

The national task force included representation from DIA, NSA and CIA led by [REDACTED] The IC Staff monitored the proceedings and was represented by [REDACTED] At no time did State-INR have representation on the national task force, or for that matter did they make any contributions whatsoever to the National Sitreps. In fact, and at

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my suggestion, it was late Monday, 23 August when DIA asked the State Department for a Sitrep being produced by their operations center. It turns out that the State Sitrep actually contained more military information <sup>than</sup> that the national task force was privy to (State received military reports from the NMCC through the NMCC duty officer stationed at State). The national task force on the other hand received only one military operational briefing from Captain O'Brien (Navy) of the JCS. During the briefing, O'Brien--apparently not realizing there were CIA personnel present--stated that on orders from the J-3 himself CIA was not to receive any operational reports.

C. National Task Force Production

What was produced was good mainly because [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CIA did the lions share of the thinking and work. Without State's participation and a military operational input, however, the final product really represented no more <sup>than</sup> ~~than~~ what was being produced by separate individual task forces at CIA and DIA.

In effect, the national task force was just another task force duplication <sup>of</sup> ~~the~~ the product already being produced by other agencies. Considerable effort was also wasted in that national task force representatives felt compelled to coordinate their inputs with their parent agencies.

2. In conclusion, the national task force did not function

as a national entity but was merely an extension of task forces already in being. It was in essence a sham, and will continue to be so until the State Department and the JCS agree to provide meaningful contributions and participation.



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